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Programme in Economie Policy
The Working Papers series
The Schuman Centre’s Programme in Economic Policy provides a framework 
for the presentation and development of ideas and research that can constitute 
the basis for informed policy-making in any area to which economic reasoning 
can make a contribution. No particular areas have been prioritized against others, 
nor is there any preference for "near-policy" treatments. Accordingly, the scope 
and style of papers in the series is varied.
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In March 1996 the Employment Select Committee of the British House 
of Commons recommended the introduction, on a pilot basis, of a scheme to 
make all the long term unemployed an offer of a subsidised private sector job 
or, as a last resort, a state provided work placement in the community1. The 
Committee claimed that if such a scheme was extended nationally long term 
unemployment could be reduced if not indeed virtually eliminated. Although the 
present UK Government would be unlikely to take such a proposal forward, an 
incoming Labour Government might take up the proposal. ’New Labour’ has 
already proposed a similar scheme for the long term unemployed aged between 
20-24.
This proposal was based in part on ideas put forward by two prominent 
academic economists2, and it raises interesting issues to do with the role of 
economists in the framing of economic policy. These economists have argued 
for a ’systemic’ change in the state’s approach to long term unemployment, 
based on their judgement of the macro-economic impact of active labour market 
policy.
In particular the proposals build on the macro-econometric finding that the 
long term unemployed play no role in holding down wage inflation, so that an 
increase in their employment rates would generate no inflationary pressures. If 
employers used a wage subsidy to hire more of the long term unemployed at the 
expense of the short term unemployed or even by reducing their existing 
workforce, this would not matter. For a higher level of short term unemployment 
would reduce wage inflation, so allowing for an expansion of real demand, so 
that the workers who have been substituted against will all find work again, and 
relatively quickly before they become long term unemployed. When the subsidy 
or the placement on the community work programme finished, some of the 
previously long term unemployed participants might obviously find themselves 
unemployed again. But because they are now short term unemployed they too 
will place downward pressure on wage inflation, allowing for an expansion of 
real demand and an increase in employment sufficient to absorb them all.
Thus the whole economic rationale for this programme is based on one 
macro-econometric finding, that the long term unemployed play no role in 
holding down wage inflation, but that the rate of short term unemployment 
adjusts relatively quickly to its ’equilibrium’ rate. This is not the place to discuss 
the nature of the work carried out, for example, at the Centre for Economic 
Performance at the London School of Economics, which has arrived at this 
finding3. However, it needs to be stressed that many economists, not least at the 



























































































believe that it is just plain wrong4. The questions to be posed are, firstly, 
whether the Employment Select Committee of the House of Commons has been 
told of these disagreements? And secondly, is it wise to proceed towards a 
’systemic’ change in the treatment of the long term unemployed in Britain, or 
elsewhere, based on a research finding which is so controversial?
The alternative route for thinking about the role of active labour market 
policy is to look carefully at the micro-economic evaluations of specific 
programmes. This should at least be a complimentary approach to the attempt 
to think about the impact of active labour market policy at a macro-economic 
level. Although macro-economic models can be used to suggest that countries 
which place heavy emphasis on active labour market policy may have a better 
outcome in terms of aggregate unemployment, these models cannot show what 
kinds of active policies might work best. Only micro-evaluations can tell us 
anything about the relative effectiveness of different active policies.
The aim of this paper is to place the case for active labour market policy 
as a solution to unemployment in the context of research on the effectiveness of 
actual programmes5.It is worth emphasising that in this field there are few, if 
any, new ideas. Almost everything has been tried before in some form or other, 
and in most of the advanced industrial countries. There are lessons - positive and 
negative - to be learned from this experience.
It should be clear from the title of the paper that one of the main 
conclusions is that we need to be realistic over what active labour market policy 
can and cannot achieve. There is always a danger of over emphasising the 
efficacy of any one instrument of policy in the debate over unemployment. 
Labour market programmes have a role to play, but a modest one.
Types of active labour market policy
Active labour market policy is a term which covers a number of 
programmes designed to improve the efficiency with which the labour market 
works, and to promote greater equality of opportunity in the labour market.
It is helpful to divide labour market programmes into four different types: 1
1) Measures to reduce mismatch
At the heart of active labour market policy lies the public employment 
service, with responsibility for matching jobseekers to notified vacancies, 
counselling those looking for work, enhancing the extent and quality of job 
search, placing some jobseekers in relevant employment programmes, and 




























































































2) Measures to raise the stock of skills
In most countries it is also the employment service which provides or 
purchases training places for the unemployed in order to reduce any mismatch 
due to an imbalance of skills in the labour market. Many countries also try to 
influence the incidence of training for those already in employment, though in 
practice few countries devote many resources to this end.
3) Measures to directly increase the demand for labour
This can be done either by providing temporary places in specific work 
programmes, usually with public or voluntary agencies, and offering low skilled 
jobs in such areas as environmental work or social and community services. 
Alternatively, the authorities can try to use incentives such as recruitment 
subsidies to try and encourage private employers to take on more of the 
unemployed6. It is this combination of measures to increase the demand for the 
long term unemployed which lie at the heart of current proposals in the UK.
4) Measures to promote equality of opportunity in employment.
Most programmes tend to be skewed towards groups who are most likely 
to be marginalised in the labour market, such as the adult long term 
unemployed, the disabled and disadvantaged young people. Many governments 
have identified youth unemployment as a particularly serious political and social 
problem, so that youth programmes make up a significant part of the provision 
offered in most countries.
Active labour market policy in the OECD countries
The range of resources devoted to labour market programmes aimed at the 
unemployed varies significantly across the OECD countries (Figure 1). In 1992- 
93 Britain spent about one half of one per cent of GDP on such programmes, 
compared with over two per cent in Sweden, for example. Britain also spent less 
on ’passive’ support for the unemployed (that is unemployment benefits) than 
in many other European countries, reflecting the relatively less generous rates 
of benefit paid in Britain when compared with, for example, the Netherlands.
Britain’s spending on its employment service, at one fifth of one per cent 
of GDP, was in line with other countries. Britain spent significantly less than 
other countries on training schemes and direct job creation aimed at the 
unemployed.
Enthusiasm for active labour market policies was at its height in the late 
1980s when many observers argued that such policies could ’pay for 




























































































as Sweden, which devoted considerable resources to labour market programmes, 
also had significantly lower unemployment rates and therefore a smaller burden 
in terms of benefit expenditure. Unfortunately in the early 1990s this argument 
can no longer be sustained, as deep recessions in countries such as Sweden have 
resulted in very high rates of unemployment and consequently very high levels 
of spending on benefits (Figure 1). It is no longer possible to look at the patterns 
of spending on labour market programmes and benefits as shown in Figure 1 to 
demonstrate any clear case for active labour market policy.
The recent experience of countries such as Sweden also calls into question 
the strength of the argument that active labour market polices can improve the 
unemployment-inflation trade off by containing long term unemployment. The 
Swedish experience in the 1980s was held up to exemplify this - open long term 
unemployment was kept down by enrolling jobseekers onto labour market 
programmes and inflation remained moderate. However, in the early 1990s open 
short term unemployment in Sweden rose sharply and by 1994-95 was 
significantly higher than in the UK. Open long term unemployment was kept 
relatively low due to the dramatic expansion of schemes, but the outcome for 
inflation in Sweden was no different from in Britain.
In Britain since the late 1980s there has been a clear shift in resources 
away from training programmes and direct job creation towards the initiatives 
run by the Employment Service8 Over the period 1990-91 to 1993-94 spending 
on the Employment Service increased by nearly half in real terms. Spending on 
training programmes aimed at the unemployed fell by over a quarter in real 
terms, and spending on Youth Training fell by a third although this latter trend 
mainly reflected the increase in enrolment in full time education.
By 1994-95 the Employment Service in Britain was administrating a 
battery of measures designed to improve placement services, assist job search 
and provide enhanced counselling for the unemployed (Table 1). Initiatives such 
as Jobclubs, Jobplan and Restart Courses offer similar provision, but aimed at 
different categories of the long term unemployed (for these three programmes, 
those out of work for six, 12 and 24 months respectively). This battery of 
measures is designed to provide a series of nets to catch the unemployed as they 
approach different durations of unemployment, and are as extensive as anywhere 
in the OECD.
What clearly distinguishes these Employment Service initiatives from 
training, work and youth programmes, and recruitment subsidies, is their 
significantly lower cost (Table 1). At a cost per place of £100-200 versus £2000- 
3000 for the more expensive measures, the latter would have to demonstrate 
significantly better outcomes in terms of participants successfully placed in work 




























































































The results of research on active labour market policy
Economic research has tried to assess how far different labour market 
programmes have significantly increased the chances of unemployed participants 
finding employment or higher earnings. It thus focuses on the economic effects 
of these programmes, though this is not to say that there may not be social 
benefits as well.
Simply recording the proportion of participants who obtain jobs at the end 
of a programme is in itself not very meaningful. Firstly, the ’job entry rate' is 
very sensitive to the economic cycle. More people leave programmes to enter 
jobs during periods of economic recovery than in periods of recession, but this 
tells us nothing about the quality of the programmes.
More fundamentally many unemployed people are finding jobs all the 
time, so that to note that a certain proportion of people leave a programme to 
enter jobs is in itself meaningless unless we can know what proportion would 
have found work anyway - the ’deadweight’ of a programme. Also people on 
programmes may find work but only by ’substituting’ for other jobseekers. 
Finally, direct job creation programmes may ’displace’ work in other enterprises 
in the economy.
Economists have tried to model the impact of programmes in order to 
assess their effectiveness, taking into account the economic cycle, and 
deadweight, substitution and displacement effects. Surveys of participants or of 
employers and programme providers can also help to shed light on the 
performance of a programme.
However, the best way of taking into account the problem of ’deadweight’ 
is to conduct an ’experiment’ where unemployed people are randomly assigned 
into two groups - an ’experimental’ group which benefits from the programme, 
and a second ’control’ group which receives no assistance. The two groups are 
then compared over time to see whether those on the programme have found 
jobs at a significantly higher rate than the control group. Even this approach 
cannot tell us whether those in the experimental group have found work by 
substituting for other jobseekers.
Most of the research discussed in this paper comes from three countries: 
Britain, the United States (because this is where the best research has been 
conducted) and Sweden (because it is the country which has most heavily 
emphasised labour market programmes). Table 2 summarises both the results of 
research and the trade offs which have to be considered when addressing the 




























































































Measures to reduce mismatch - the Employment Service.
There is a stronger body of evidence on the beneficial effects of improved 
placement services and job search assistance on the subsequent job prospects of 
the unemployed than on any other component of active labour market policy.
The only classic experiment in Sweden to investigate the effects of a 
labour market programme followed four hundred individuals who had been out 
of work for over three months and were randomly assigned to an experimental 
group, which received intensified assistance from the Employment Service, and 
a control group with access to only normal assistance9. After one year. 55 per 
cent of those in the experimental group were in employment compared with only 
42 per cent in the control group. The jobs obtained by the experimental group 
were significantly better paid, more likely to be permanent and involved more 
in-plant training.
An experimental approach was also used to investigate the effects of the 
Restart process in Britain10. It too came up with modest positive results, with 
27 per cent of the Restart group in employment after 12 months compared with 
23 per cent of the control group. Whether this was the result of the enhanced job 
search assistance and counselling offered by the Employment Service, or was the 
result of the impact of threatened benefit sanctions on those who did not 
demonstrate active job search, is a matter of some controversy. This illustrates 
the problem that although experimental approaches can help tell us whether a 
programme has worked, it might be a matter of further interpretation as to why 
it has worked.
Experimental approaches used to investigate the effects of offering 
improved placement assistance to mainly single mothers in receipt of welfare 
benefits in the United States have also demonstrated positive effects. These 
successful programmes have put heavy emphasis on active job search by 
participants".
Two critical points to stress about such programmes is that they are not 
very costly (Table 1), and they would seem to carry no risk of any adverse side 
effects.
Measures to raise the stock of skills - training programmes
Training the unemployed makes obvious intuitive sense. But it should be 
emphasised that finding convincing evidence for the beneficial effects of large 
training programmes is hard to come by. Perhaps the most extensive evidence 
comes from the United States. Single parents and unemployed people have been 
randomly assigned to, firstly, a group receiving additional assistance with job 
search, secondly, a group receiving job search assistance plus access to education 




























































































There have been modestly significant positive effects on subsequent employment 
and earnings for those receiving job search assistance but no additional positive 
effects for those who also received training12. This suggests strongly that large 
scale training programmes offer no more benefits than would be attained from 
the far cheaper programmes run by the Employment Service.
The evaluations of training programmes in Sweden have generally 
produced ambiguous results. A review of the five most recent studies into the 
effects of training programmes in Sweden on subsequent earnings emphasised 
the wide range of estimates and the lack of convincing statistically significant 
positive results^. Experience in Sweden also shows how sensitive the ’success’ 
of programmes is to the state of the cycle. In the booming late 1980s three out 
of four of those leaving training programmes in Sweden were going into jobs. 
In recession hit 1993 only one in four were finding work (compared with one 
in three in Britain on the Employment Training programme in this same year).
The OECD in its extensive review of international evidence found little 
support for the view that broadly targeted training programmes had significant 
beneficial effects14. However, smaller targeted programmes aimed at groups 
which only face moderate problems in the labour market may yield significant 
positive results. For example, a study found significant positive effects on 
subsequent earnings and employment for the relatively small scale Training 
Opportunities Programme (TOPs) which ran in Britain in the mid-1980s, and 
which at its peak offered some 80,000 places15. So an effective high quality 
training programme is likely to be relatively small in scale and to contribute 
little to any immediate reduction in headline unemployment. It is also likely to 
be relatively expensive. TOPs cost over twice as much per place as the current 
Training for Work programme in Britain.
It is worth asking why simple initiatives designed to enhance job search 
seem to be far more cost-effective than large training programmes? Surveys of 
employers constantly pick up concerns about the ’personal skills’ and 
characteristics of job applicants, that is their motivation, ability to communicate 
and to get along with other employees, and so on. Generally the existence or not 
of those skills is a more important factor than possession of formal qualifications 
in determining recruitment, especially for the lower skill occupations16. 
Apparently simple interventions which have the effect of raising an individual’s 
outward signs of motivation, or helping them to better compile a CV or handle 
an interview (which are the means by which an individual can best signal their 
possession of some of these ’personal skills’), might thus have a more significant 




























































































Measures to increase the demand for labour - work programmes and recruitment 
subsidies
Research in Sweden has found that relief work in construction related 
activities results in very high levels of displacement of regular activity17. This 
is not true, however, of places in social and community schemes. However, in 
the more welfare orientated projects the work being performed was necessarily 
of marginal social value - this was the only way to ensure that the schemes were 
not displacing regular activity.
Traditionally there had been no Swedish research on the effects of 
participation on work programmes on subsequent employment. This was because 
such schemes were intended merely to tide people over until the regular labour 
market recovered and were not intended to have the effect of significantly 
boosting subsequent job prospects. However, more recent research argued that 
adult participants on Swedish work programmes appeared to search no more 
intensively for regular jobs than those already employed, and that participants 
were not significantly more likely to find work than the openly unemployed18. 
Results for the UK Community Programme which ran in Britain in the mid- 
1980s also showed no significant impact on the flows out of unemployment for 
participants19.
An economy which has very high unemployment is one which is likely 
to be running a large budget deficit, as in Britain and Sweden in the mid-1990s. 
Inevitably then any work programme will need to have a low cost per place, and 
in order to avoid displacing regular work will need to be at the margins of 
socially useful activity. Labour market programmes are instituted because of the 
shortage of regular employment opportunities. But in order not to interfere with 
the regular workings of the labour market, such programme places must not look 
or feel like regular jobs. They have to offer relatively low rates of pay so that 
the incentive to obtain a regular job remains. This was the paradox faced by the 
Community Programme in Britain in the mid-1980s. This kind of work 
programme will always represent a stop-gap, and indeed the recommendations 
made by the House of Commons Select Committee seemed to recognise this.
An evaluation based on questionnaires and interviews of employers of the 
effects of recruitment subsidies used in Sweden in 1978-9 and 1982 suggested 
that the net employment effect was very limited.20 Most of the recruitment 
would have taken place anyway. The OECD in its review of the evidence found 
that the combined effect of deadweight, substitution and displacement for 
recruitment subsidies ranged between 76 and 95 per cent21. Other reviews also 
report that combined deadweight and substitution appear to range from 70 to 90 




























































































The results of the evaluation of the Workstart pilots in Britain, which in 
part formed the basis for the House of Commons Employment Select Committee 
recommendations, are in line with this previous international experience23. This 
programme offered a subsidy over one year of £2340 to employers willing to 
take on people who had been out of work for over two or four years. Finding 
placements involved considerable administrative effort and expense on the part 
of the Employment Service. Just under half the jobs ’created’ were deadweight 
and another third involved employers substituting the long term unemployed for 
other jobseekers. As the authors point out this was the programme’s intention. 
Recruitment subsidies do not create many new jobs. Rather their rationale is 
similar to that for the Employment Service programmes, that is the aim is to 
make a bigger share of employment opportunities available to especially 
disadvantaged jobseekers. So it makes sense for these subsidies to be 
administered by the Employment Service as an adjunct to other initiatives 
designed to improve job search. However, these subsidies are much more 
expensive than assistance with job search which would imply that their use has 
to be restricted to the most disadvantaged jobseekers, particularly the very long 
term unemployed.
Measures to promote equality of opportunity - Youth programmes
Politically and socially it is often youth unemployment which is seen as 
one of the greatest problems. The evidence from across the OECD is that the 
young are generally the most likely to benefit from a general upturn in the 
economy, just as they suffer most during economic downturns. Those unlikely 
to benefit immediately from a generalised expansion are those young people who 
tend to be relatively unqualified. Many will come from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, have had negative experiences at school and subsequently will 
have negative perceptions of state training or work programmes
This helps explain why many programmes aimed at the young 
unemployed have a poor track record. They are often targeting the ’hard core’ 
of any age cohort. While attempts to draw such people back into the formal 
education and training system need to be made, in practice what they are most 
likely to respond to is some kind of work based programme, with a mix of off- 
and on-the-job training. This is an accurate description of much of the existing 
provision offered by Youth Training in Britain. However, YT does not pick up 
a small minority of the age cohort. What this minority seems to want are jobs, 
and most countries leave open the safety valve of work without training for a 
small minority of each age group. At times when the labour market is tight such 




























































































is to be relaxed about the provision offered under any state ’training' scheme so 
that it can offer placements where the emphasis is definitely on the work rather 
than the instruction.
Conclusions: Designing an optimal active labour market policy
The recent movement of resources in Britain away from training and work 
programmes towards the initiatives run by the Employment Service is 
overwhelmingly backed by the results of research from across the OECD. 
Simple initiatives which offer improved placement services or assistance with 
job search can be shown to significantly boost participants’ job prospects. The 
evidence for the effects of training and work programmes is much more mixed.
Training programmes which offer some chance of success should be 
relatively small but of high quality like the old Training Opportunities 
Programme in Britain which offered fewer than 100,000 places over a year. 
There is a separate issue of ensuring that unemployed people can undertake part 
time courses in mainstream further and higher education without threatening 
their benefit entitlement.
This training provision should be clearly separated from any work 
programme. There is a strong social case for having such a programme offering 
places for the most disadvantaged jobseekers. It is the kind of programme which 
could be easily expanded to counter the effects of a modest recession. But its 
economic benefits should not be exaggerated. In the context of a labour market 
in Britain which in the mid-1990s was seen to be generating, in the eyes of 
critics, too many temporary, part time, low paid and low skilled jobs, it would 
be a scheme offering temporary, probably part time, inevitably low paid and low 
skilled jobs. Like the old Community Programme it would offer a stop-gap, not 
a solution. The fact that the Community Programme continues to be regarded 
quite favourably is probably because it promised relatively little, unlike the over­
hyped Employment Training programme which supplanted it.
The Employment Service should also have the option to use recruitment 
subsidies to help place the very long term unemployed, to be used alongside the 
other placement/job search/counselling initiatives. But their use would have to 
be kept to a minimum as they are potentially expensive and require considerable 
administrative effort to secure places. The UK’s experience with its Workstart 
scheme is informative. Finding some 1500 places in just over a year in four 
areas during the Workstart pilot phase proved demanding. These jobs were 
overwhelmingly in very small enterprises. Grossing these 1500 places up to 
represent all the labour markets in Britain would suggest the scope for up to 




























































































opportunities for the very long term unemployed. This would be equivalent to 
about 3-4 per cent of those out of work for over two years in April 1995.
In Britain, the guarantee to provide a place on Youth Training for all 16- 
17 year olds has failed to reach a minority of each age cohort in Britain. There 
is a case for having more flexibility in the administration of such youth 
programmes so that more placements can be found for the most disadvantaged 
young people, even if those placements make less sense in labour market terms. 
This is to emphasise the ’social’ function of programmes like YT. It should also 
be accepted that for a very small minority of each age group - perhaps 5-10 per 
cent - what they want is a job, and not education or training. This safety valve 
has to be kept open even if the numbers taking this route must be minimised by 
efforts to attract as many as possible into further education or training.
This list of policies looks decidedly uninspiring, especially when 
compared with the grand schemes offered by other academics. However, it is 
based on a realistic assessment of what active labour market policy can and 
cannot achieve, drawing on the evidence from micro-economic research on the 
effectiveness of different programmes. Some individuals have been able to grab 
the attention of policy makers with grandiose schemes, capable of being sold 
only to those not aware of the evidence on whether such schemes can be shown 
to work or not.
There are some clear issues here for economists. Firstly, are economists 
more confident about the results drawn from careful micro-economic studies 
including those employing experimental designs, or results drawn from macro- 
economic models or even purely theoretical approaches? Secondly, is it the job 
of economists to act as evangelists for particular polices, or to lay before the 
policy makers the whole range of evidence on the efficacy of a particular policy, 
making clear all the assumptions which lie behind the suggested impact of such 
policies, so that the policy makers can make up their own minds?
There can be a price to pay for exaggerating the role of labour market 
programmes, if it leads to the neglect of other policy instruments, and especially 
if such programmes are sold as offering a possible free lunch. In Sweden in the 
early 1990s over-confidence in the capacity of active labour market policy to 
contain unemployment contributed to errors in monetary policy which made the 
recession there much worse.
It might be time for active labour market policy to be seen as one of the 
more modest instruments of economic policy, which can make some contribution 
to improving the efficient operation of the labour market and to the delivery of 





























































































The scale and cost of employment and training programmes in 
England and Wales. 1994-95
Employment Service Droerammes
Number of places Cost per place
Jobclubs 257.000 £196
Jobfinders grants 4.700 £181
Job interview Guarantee 300.000 £6
Jobplan 250.000 £127
Job review workshop 40,000 £80
Job search seminar 65.000 £75
One-to-one 10.000 n/a
Restart courses 144.000 £98
T ravel-to-interview 55,000 £40
Work Trials 20.000 £110
Workwise 10.000 n/a
Trainine Droerammes
Training for Work 280.000 £2475
Career Development loans 35.000 n/a
(In mainstream education)* (80.000) n/a
Work Droerammes
Community Action 50.000 £1860
Recruitment Subsidies




Youth Training 232,000 £2831
Source: Employment Department Group: Departmental Report, 1995,
* Estimate from Labour Force Survey of the number of unemployed claimants 
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